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ably discussed in legal periodicals.21 Further legislation is needed to
perfect the Act, for as Judge Hoffman stated:
These questions as well as others bound to arise are best settled
by future legislative amendment, although in the absence of such
action, it will be the duty of the courts to frame a solution based
upon their interpretation of the statute as written.2 2 (Emphasis
added.)
The instant case is evidence that the Act may, in close situations,
be construed in favor of the landlord, thus rendering the purpose of
the Act almost meaningless. It is anticipated that the amendment now
being formulated will be adopted by the Legislature in the near future
in order to partially fulfill the inherent potential of the Act.
Stephen G. Walker
PATENTS-PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER-The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has held that the mere fact that elements of a claimed
method for the reduction of data may be accomplished using the mind
or a general purpose digital computer properly programmed does not
invalidate the claim as a process within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 101.
The court has further raised substantial doubt as to the unpatentability
of "mental step" claims generally and has applied the distinction of
functions occurring in nature being accomplished by methods outside
nature to mental functions.
In re Prater, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
Nov. 20, 1968.
Applicant-appellants, Prater and Wei, in 1961 applied for a patent
entitled "Reduction of Data From Spectral Analysis"' by disclosing
a method and apparatus to determine, with minimum error, the con-
21. See, Comments, Substandard Housing: The New Pennsylvania Rent Withholding
Act; (5) situations where the premises are so unfit that imminent danger exists.
vania, 30 UNIV. PITr. L. REV. 148 (1968). Among the problems posed therein are: (1)
lack of administrative machinery to effectuate repairs; (2) insufficient funds in the escrow
account to make repairs needed; (3) participation in rent withholding of one tenant in
a multi-tenant dwelling; (4) lack of education of the tenants of their remedies under the
Act; (5) situations where the premises are so unfit that imminent danger exists.
22. See n.1, at 21 of 214 Pa. Super. 9, and at 829 of 249 A.2d 828.
1. Serial No. 155,236, filed Nov. 20, 1961.
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centration of components of a mixture where the components are
known but the number of concentration-related peaks of the spectra
-exceed the number of components. The novel feature of the process
disclosed by the applicants was the discovery that the optimum set of
peaks for accurate concentration determination might be isolated from
the much larger family of possible sets of peaks by finding the set of
equations (an equation set being related to each peak set) having the
largest determinant among all the possible sets.2 This novel feature was
embodied in a machine also disclosed by appellants. The machine spe-
cifically utilized an electrical circuit to generate a graphic representa-
tion of all determinants on an oscilloscope, a servo-operated photo-
electrical device to detect the represented determinant of greatest
magnitude, and a series of meters to read the resultant signals for indi-
vidual components when the optimum determinant had been detected.
Both the method and the machine were claimed. The applicants re-
vealed that the functions accomplished by the disclosed machine, ap-
2. The spectra which is the subject of analysis consists of an analog signal charac-
terized by a relatively level base line interrupted by bumps or peaks of varying heights.
These peaks are individually related to single components or combinations of com-
ponents. Consider, for example, a mixture containing only two constituents but which
has a spectra containing five peaks. The peak heights could be represented by:
Y1= alXl + a 12X 2
Y2 a21 X, + a22 X.2 Y's are peak heights
Y 3  a 31 X 1 +X a32X 2  X's are concentrations
Y4  a 41 X 1 + a 42 X 2  a's are coefficients
Y5- aslXl + a5 2X 2
It is evident that ten combinations of two equations are possible for solution of the
concentrations. Obviously, in more complex mixtures with more interaction peaks, which
is the usual case, the possible number of combinations could be extremely large and the
investigator would be faced with the formidable and tedious task of trying each set.
The determinant for the first pair of equations in this example is:
A.12 - alla2 a 2 2 - a2 1 a1 2
a 21 a 2 2
and: X1 = (Yla 22 - Y2al )A12
Thus: X2 = (Y1 - alX 1 )a 1 2
This same analysis can be repeated for each of the remaining nine pairs of equations
and a total of ten values for the concentrations would result. The experimenter would
then be confronted with the problem of selecting which of the ten sets of concentration
values most accurately represented the mixture.
The applicants here discovered that the values associated with the determinant of
greatest magnitude most closely represent the mixture. With this discovery in hand the
aspects of solution just presented, being conventional mathematical techniques, may be
readily found in many elementary mathematics texts.
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propriately classified as an analog computer, might also be accomplished
by a digital computer.8
The examiner rejected both the applicants' method and machine
claims, basing his decision on the ground that the claims failed to
comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. 4 In regard to the
method claim the examiner concluded that the claim, if within any
statutory class enunciated under 35 U.S.C. § 101, must be a process,
and the process claimed by the applicants constituted a mental process
for the calculational procedure claimed could be accomplished in the
mind of man. In support of this conclusion, the examiner relied on
In re Abrans5 which held that claims for mental processes are outside
the classes of invention authorized patent protection by Congress. Alter-
natively, the examiner argued that even if the claim included matter
within the statutory class, the presence in the claim of portions relating
to a mental process invalidated the entire claim on the ground of failing
to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention under 35
U.S.C. § 112.
In rejecting the apparatus claims, the examiner argued that following
derivation of their calculational procedure it would be obvious within
the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 to one skilled in the art of computer
programming to so modify a general purpose digital computer that it
could carry out the procedure. Further, the examiner argued that even
if the analog computer specified by the applicants were patentable, the
claim by use of the broad terminology "means" to describe the calcula-
tional element necessarily included a general purpose digital computer
and thus the claim failed to particularly point out a machine invention
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
3. Inclusion of the suggestion that the process might be accomplished by an alternate
means was apparently to avoid application of the "inherent function" doctrine which
was overruled just a few months prior to the. instant decision in the case of In re
Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964), limits patentable subject matter to, "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof .. "; 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964), denies a patent if, "the invention was known
or used by others in this country ... before the invention thereof by the applicant .. ";
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964), states that, "A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which such subject matter pertains";
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964), requires that, "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention."
5. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
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examiner in regard to all claims contained in the application. In their
decision, the Board of Appeals agreed with the examiner that the
process disclosed was a mental calculation procedure outside the statu-
tory patentable process class and that the machine would be unpatent-
able since it was a mere apparatus counterpart of the unpatentable
method." The Board further concluded that the machine would be an
obvious step, in relation to the calculational procedure.
It may be observed at this point that all rejection arguments were
necessarily dependent upon the conclusion that the process disclosed
was not a process within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The applicants appealed to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141.1 That Court reversed,
holding that the fact that steps of a method may alternatively be carried
out in the human mind or by a general purpose digital computer will
not invalidate the claims where the inventor has disclosed an apparatus
for accomplishing the steps without human intervention. The court did
not go so far as to hold that all novel mental steps are within the statu-
tory class of processes which may be patented. The court, by distinguish-
ing Abrams rather than overruling it, avoided holding that a novel
mental process disclosed without an accompanying disclosure of a novel
non-human means for its accomplishment would be patentable. There-
fore the court was not required to reach a decision concerning the situa-
tion in which the only claim for the means of carrying out the process
was a general purpose digital computer.
When enacted, the 1952 Patent Act codified existing law by establish-
ing a statutory class of process to be afforded patent protection., The
Supreme Court in 1877, in the case of Cochrane v. Deener9 stated that
it was beyond dispute that a process could be the subject of a patent.
The definition of a process in Cochrane as "a mode of treatment of cer-
6. In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951). Where not an apparatus for carrying
out a process, but an article of manufacture resulting from a claimed process and
described in tenns of the process was claimed and the claim rejected for the article,
aside from its method of production, was old.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1964), provides that, "An applicant dissatisfied with the decision
of the Board of Appeals may appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals."
8. Process is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1964), as a "process, art or method, and in-
cludes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material."; and as this was drafted in the light of existing judicial definitions the Patent
Office has published in its Guidelines to Examination of Programs the assertion that,
"Mathematical formulas are not included within 35 USC 101 since they are not a
process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or useful improvements
thereof.", 829 Official Gazette 865, August 16, 1966.
9. 94 U.S. 139 (1877).
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tain materials to produce a given result"'10 was apparently cited by the
Board of Appeals as a limitation upon process patentability, but the
instant court emphatically denied this view. With reference to a later
sentence in Cochrane, that "[t]he process requires that certain things
should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the
tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence,"'1
Judge Smith logically concluded that the purpose of the definition or
statement was not to limit the meaning of "process" but to show that,
"a process is not limited by the means used to perform it. ' ' 12
Relying on a statement from the Supreme Court case of Tilghman
v. Proctor3 which referred to a process as "an act, or mode of acting"
and as, "a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
being executed or performed,' 4 Judge Smith expressed the view that
"process" must be more extensive than the "definition" in Cochrane
and that the mental aspect of process inventions (presumably all process
inventions) requires particular attention in the course of a determina-
tion of patentability.' 5 While these two earlier cases involved processes
acting to change matter (Cochrane was a flour making process, Tilgh-
man was a fatty acid and glycerine process), the protection of the
patent system was attached to processes acting on energy in the Tele-
phone Cases' decided in 1887 involving the basic patents of Alexander
Graham Bell.
In 1935 the Supreme Court upheld a process claim for accomplishing
a function which occurs naturally-the incubation of eggs. In Waxham
v. Smith 7 the court stated that since the claimed process accomplished
the function occurring in nature by a means which had never occurred
in nature, the process was patentable. In the present case the court said,
"[a]lthough appellants' novel calculations performed in the mind of a
man might possibly be considered to be in nature, performance of the
process of these novel calculations on a computer is by 'a means which
had never occurred in nature.' "'s
It is imperative to discuss Waxham and a possible distinguishing
characteristic existing between it and the instant case not indicated in
10. Id. at 141.
11. Id.
12. In re Prater, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Nov. 20, 1968.
13. 102 US. 279 (1881).
14. Id. at 283.
15. In re Prater at -. (All citations are to the slip opinion.)
16. 126 US. 1 (1888).
17. 294 US. 20 (1935).
18. Prater at 25.
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the present opinion. In Waxham, although the function or resultant
effect might have occurred naturally, the process did not occur in
nature. The process as claimed by Smith and found valid and infringed
in Waxham was not hatching eggs by the application of heat; for if
stated so broadly it would have included natural incubation; it was
hatching eggs by arranging them in a chamber of particular design,
applying a current of heated air in such a manner that heat transferred
from eggs at a more advanced stage of incubation to those in a less
advanced stage. 19 The process disclosed in that case for the incubation
of eggs constituted a sequence of occurrences which would not have
occurred in nature-in the sense that the intervention of the inventor
was required to bring the separate elements, each governed by nature,
together in a new way to accomplish the same result that would occur
naturally with improved efficiency. If calculations performed in the
mind of man are in nature as the court suggests, and the same calcula-
tions are performed on a general purpose digital computer according
to standard programming conventions, then it becomes difficult to con-
clude that the accomplishment of the entire natural thought process
(as it may be communicated from one human to another in mathemati-
cal form) by a prior art machine is a patentable contribution no matter
how novel the discovery or development of the calculational procedure.
It must be remembered that while the result and function in Waxham
occurred in nature the claimed process did not. But a process in which
information is being acted upon might logically be considered to be
in nature unless the calculational procedure could be demonstrated to
be inherently outside the capability of a human mind. While the court
in the instant case indicated an awareness of the relevance of the
question whether a calculational procedure occurs in nature, it made
no attempt to resolve this question, which may be the most crucial
question necessary to a determination of patentability of processes that
act upon information rather than material or energy.
The instant court said, "we find nothing to indicate an intent of
Congress or the courts to deny patent protection to process claims
19. U.S. Patent No. 1,262,860.
The method of hatching a plurality of eggs by arranging them at different levels
in a closed chamber having restricted openings of sufficient capacity for the escape
of foul air without undue loss of moisture and applying a current of heated air,
said current being created by means other than variations of temperature, and of
sufficient velocity to circulate, diffuse and maintain the air throughout the chamber
at substantially the same temperature, whereby the air will be vitalized, the moisture
conserved and the units of heat will be carried from the eggs in the more advanced
stage of incubation to those in a less advanced stage for the purpose specified.
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merely because they could alternatively be read on a process performed
through the mind by the use of aids such as pencil and paper." 20 If
the negative implication of this statement is construed to mean that a
rejection would obtain for claims for a process unaccompanied by
means for carrying it out other than use of the mind assisted by aids
available to the art, then the obvious question will arise. Is the computer
for accomplishment of the process a mere aid like pencil and paper?
If so, a claim for information processing accompanied by a means claim
consisting of logic to program a general purpose digital computer
should be rejected unless the process put the machine to an unantic-
ipated use and was written not to include use of the human mind.
Such digression serves to demonstrate what the court did not hold. It
did not, despite comments in the general business press, 21 hold that
computer programs are patentable. But by failing to make the distinc-
tion as per Waxham and failing to resolve to some extent whether
calculational procedures are "in nature," the court missed an op-
portunity to bring some order to this developing area of patent
activity.
The instant court's analysis of Abrams attached significance to the
distinction that in the present case there was a disclosure of a means
for performance of the process; while in Abrams no means had been
disclosed to avoid accomplishing the process by mental effort. Judge
Smith in discussing A brams pointed out that,
Abrams disclosed no means whatever for performing the claimed
steps (5) and (6),22 of calculation and comparison. Certainly no
analog computer for carrying out these calculations is disclosed
in Abrams' specification and at the time Abrams filed (April 28,
1944), programmable general purpose digital computers for calcu-
lations of this nature were still in the future. Thus, Abrams
disclosed a claimed process including steps which could only
be performed in the mind insofar as the teachings of the applica-
tion were concerned. 23
20. Prater at 26.
21. See BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 30, 1968.
22. Abrams' claims related to a method for oil prospecting. 188 F.2d at 165.
4. measuring the rate of pressure rise per unit area of surface available for diffusion
of subsurface gases into said borehole for a number of timed intervals.
5, determining the rate of pressure rise in said borehole at a standard reference
pressure from the values obtained in step (4),
6. comparing the rates determined in step 5 for the different boreholes to detect
anomalies which are indicative of the presence of petroliferous deposits.
23. Prater at 17.
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That the court did not overrule Abrams suggests that the doctrine
of nonpatentability of "mental step" claims is still alive. Despite the
care with which Judge Smith demonstrated that the Abrams rules24
had never been adopted by the court, it is quite plain that the
court in Abrams considered mental steps alone unpatentable. 2 5 And a
careful reading of Abrams in conjunction with Halliburton26 reveals
that the claims of Abrams were indeed rejected for being "mental steps"
though the court did ultimately decide A brains by direct application of
Halliburton. Since the court in Abrams conceded the issue of novelty
to the applicant,27 the rejection of the claimed invention was necessarily
for failure to be included in any of the statutory categories of patentable
subject matter (no other issues being raised) whether determined by the
rules proposed by Abrams' counsel or by application of Halliburton.
The quote from Halliburton in the instant case that "these mental
steps, even if novel, are not patentable" if taken in context with that
court's affirmance of the trial court finding that the method patent in
issue was invalid for "its novelty lay only in the performance of certain
mental steps '28 leads to a conclusion that the Halliburton court did not
need to determine novelty for it considered "mental steps" unpatentable
rather than to the conclusion of the instant court which interpreted
the words to mean that lack of novelty destroyed the claim's validity
and determination of "mental step" patentability was unnecessary.
The instant court's deliberate choice to avoid application of the so
called Abrams' Rules to decide the present case may prove significant
24. Counsel for Abrams sought to have the court formally adopt these rules:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely mental in character, the subject
matter thereof is not patentable within the meaning of the patent statutes.
2. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as so-called
mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides in one or more
of the so-called mental steps, then the claim is considered unpatentable for the same
reason that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as so-called
mental steps, yet the novelty or advance over the art resides in one or more of the
positive and physical steps and the so-called mental step or steps are incidental
parts of the process which are essential to define, qualify or limit its scope, then
the claim is patentable and not subject to the objection contained in 1 and 2 above.
188 F.2d at 166.
25. "Citation of authority in support of the principle that claims to mental concepts
which constitute the very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable is un-
necessary. It is self-evident that thought is not patentable." 188 F.2d at 168.
26. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944).
27. "Inasmuch as no prior art was cited below, it would appear that an advance in
the art is conceded so far as the tribunals of the Patent Office are concerned . . . the
sole question is whether the novelty thus assumed is the result of a physical act or is
simply a mental concept." 188 F.2d at 167.
28. 146 F.2d at 821.
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to the development of the law concerning patentability of "mental
step" claimed. Had the court applied the Abrams rules it seems likely
that the present case would have been decided against rather than for
the applicants as to their process claims which appear to be characterized
by A brains rule two. 29
While under this decision, systems involving elements which may be
accomplished by alternative natural means are not outside the statutqry
class of process, no general conclusion as to the patentability of com-
puter programs (representing thought processes to be processed by aid
of a general purpose digital computer) is now possible. The sufficient
elements comprising this system were a method of analysis, a means of
data acquisition, and a means of processing. If all three are necessary,
as well, those programs of a data processing or scientific nature (other
than those inherently outside the capability of the human mind) would
seem not to be covered.
The approach of the instant court to tie together a process claim and
a machine claim to validate the process claim is of course contrary to the
Halliburton result (although separate patents were involved there)
and is perhaps the most disquieting feature of the opinion. The instant
court has permitted a process claim to be patented where the inventors'
novel discovery was a mathematical concept which if claimed alone
without an apparatus to do the calculations directly apparently would
not have been patentable (else why the great effort to distinguish
Abrams?). The method claim3 0 read alone clearly covers doing the
29. See note 23 supra.
30. Compare these claims with the Smith claim, note 19 supra; and the Abrams
claims, note 22 supra.
The method of determining with minimum error from the spectra of spectral
analysis the concentration of the components of a mixture where the components
are known and the concentration-determining peaks of the spectral analysis are
present in number exceeding the number of said components, which comprises
generating physical representations of the magnitudes of the coefficients of simul-
taneous linear equations defining the concentrations of said components as functions
of the heights of said peaks of said spectral analysis,
generating from said physical representations of the magnitudes of said coefficients
the magnitude of the determinant of a plurality of sets of said simultaneous equa-
tions, the number of equations of each of said sets being equal in number to the
number of said components,
comparing said physical representations of the magnitudes of said determinants of
said sets of equations for identification of the set of said equations whose deter-
minant has the largest magnitude, and
generating physical representations of the concentration of each said component
of said mixture from said physical representations of the magnitudes of said co-
efficients of said set of simultaneous equations having said determinants of largest
magnitude and from said heights of said peaks included in said last-names [sic] set
of equations. (Emphasis as added by the court.)
Prater at 7.
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calculations by hand using pencil and paper, and if the claim is valid
and another does use the procedure, the patentee could successfully
sue for infringement despite the fact that the patented apparatus or its
equivalent had not been used. It seems illogical to tie the method and
machine together and look at them as a whole to find the method claim
valid when the effect is that infringement of the method claim alone
could result. This is not to say that no method claim could be drafted
that would cover the appellants' process if the court's view were not
adopted but merely that an acceptable claim should then be limited to
the process as it occurs "outside nature."
Although the instant case was decided without resolving the questions
posed earlier regarding the role of digital computers in the current
art of mathematical analysis and information processing, these ques-
tions and others, including the basic question of the nature of analytical
procedures in the light of patent law objectives must be answered soon.
And the impetus this case is likely to have upon the filing of new ap-
plications covering information processes shall hasten the time when
those questions must be answered.
E. Kears Pollock
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